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 The Impact of National Socialist Policies upon Local City Planning in Pre-war 
Germany (1933-1939): The Rhetoric and the Reality 
 
John Robert Mullin 
 
This paper is a review and analysis of the influence of the national government upon local city 
planning during the pre-war years of National Socialism (1933-1939).  The paper begins with a 
brief overview of the critical aspects of city planning during both the Wilhelmian years (1871-
1918) and the Weimar era (1918-1932).  These aspects are reviewed in the context of their 
contributions to the city planning profession in general and to the German experience in particular.  
The paper then reviews the influence of ideology on city planning activities and follows with an 
explanation of the “state of the city” at the time the NSDAP came to power.  The section on 
ideology precedes the “state of the city” section because most of the National Socialist (NSDAP) 
ideological stances were developed before the government came to power.  A description and 
analysis of the bureaucratic framework and the city planning aspects of both the Recovery Years 
(1933-1936) and the NSDAP First Four Year Plan (1936-1939) is then presented.  Finally, the 
paper concludes with an analysis and summary of the impact over time of the NSDAP supported 
city planning experience. 
 
 The coming to power of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) 
in Germany in 1933 resulted in a radical shift in the direction, approaches, and concepts 
used in city planning activities across the German nation.  The ability of each city to 
define and solve its own planning problems was significantly lessened.  In effect, city 
planning was reduced to pat formulas and standards, and became subject to the 
imposition of national ideology and national government control.1  The net result of these 
changes was that localized city planning increasingly became subject to national goals, 
needs, and programs.  This article describes, analyzes, and interprets the impact of this 
shift on city planning activities and examines the nationally supported theories, 
principles, concepts, and enactments imposed between 1933 and 1939.  There are two 
basic premises to the article.  First, that despite the shift in policies and standards, the 
results of National Socialist city planning activities were not significantly different from 
those of the Weimar era (1918-1933).  Second, that economic needs and military 
requirements in the city took precedence over both the NSDAP platform and nationally 
supported ideologies.  In time these contributed to the inability of local city planners to 
meet the needs of their client citizens. 
 The article begins with a brief overview of the critical aspects of city planning 
during the Weimar era.  The “state of the city” at the time that the NSDAP came to power 
is then summarized.  Following this, the article focuses upon the immediate measures 
taken by the new government to overcome the extreme economic and social problems 
that were inherited from the Weimar Government.  This section includes a review of both 
the pragmatic actions and the theoretical – ideological basis for them.  A description and 
analysis of the bureaucratic framework and the city planning aspects of both the 
Recovery Years (1933-1936) and the First Four Year Plan (1936-1940) is then 
presented.2  Finally, the investigation concludes with an analysis and summary of the 
impact over time of the NSDAP supported city planning experience. 
 
 
 
Antecedents – the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) 
 
 German city planning during the years of the Weimar Republic has been 
considered by historians and practitioners as making a major contribution to the evolution 
of modern city planning in the western world.3  In a city planning context, the Weimar 
years can be subdivided into three distinct periods.  The first, 1918-1924, was marked by 
political revolution, social unrest, and economic chaos.  While it was a period of 
extensive cultural ferment and utopian thought, little city planning was actually 
undertaken.4  Priorities centered instead upon providing basic shelter, food, and jobs.  
The second period, 1924-1929, however, saw extensive innovative city planning activity 
as many of the theoretical ideas developed during the early 1920s began to be applied.  In 
particular, new concepts concerning urban decentralization, socialized housing, 
regionalization, and urban design were integrated into planning efforts.5 
 These years saw a greater involvement by the Weimar government in city 
planning matters than in the period 1918-1924.  In particular, the nationally sponsored 
house mortgage revaluation program (the Hauszinssteuer) provided the funding necessary 
to undertake city planning activities.  Further, the national government approved of the 
creation of regional planning agencies and created a housing/city planning research 
institute.  Still, it would be a mistake to assume that the problems of the city were a high 
priority for the national government.  They simply were not.  The net result was that the 
cities continued to plan for themselves without significant national input.  The national 
government only began to focus on urban problems when the cities became virtually 
bankrupt during the depths of the Depression. 
 The third period, 1928-1933, saw the collapse of the Republic.  City planning, as 
a major governmental activity, became virtually non-existent.  Continually expanding 
unemployment and welfare roles, ruinous taxation, fixed capital costs, and little private 
investment were crucial causes.6  The soup kitchens and the fop houses of the immediate 
post World War I era again became commonplace.  Further, the increasingly conservative 
political climate of city chambers brought dramatic changes to city planning activities.  
Key members of the avant-garde, including the city planners Ernst May (Frankfurt), 
Martin Wagner (Berlin), and Bruno Taut (Magdeburg), left the country.7  Soon after, 
most of their colleagues were forced to resign and were replaced by more conservative 
and more politically acceptable planners. 
 The major planning projects supported by the Weimar Government that were 
undertaken during the early 1930s centered upon three objectives: (1) expansion of the 
food supply; (2) expansion of inexpensive housing; and (3) assistance to urban residents 
so they could become increasingly self sufficient.  These projects had many elements in 
common with the settlement ideas of the increasingly powerful NSDAP.  Among these 
were the emphasis upon non-urban settlements, “man and nature”, increased agricultural 
production, and economic self sufficiency.  Yet, these projects were scorned by the 
NSDAP.  How, asked the Party, could people find work in a decentralized locality with 
little money and with farm lots that could result in personal food stuffs and little else?  
Some of this criticism was well founded.  In fact, the program was greatly revised when 
the new government came to power. 
 In sum, city planning during the Weimar Republic was largely a localized 
activity.  The national government provided essential enabling legislation and a funding 
mechanism but little else.  The theories and ideologies that formed the basis for the 
planning activities were largely created by organizations and people outside of the 
national government.  The application of the ideas and concepts was dependent upon the 
innovativeness, skill, interest, and political strength of city-based administrators.  The 
ability of these administrators to take independent action, a long standing tradition in 
Germany, was significantly curtailed with the formation of the Third Reich. 
 
The New Government – The NSDAP Comes to Power 
 
 The turmoil of the early 1930s had certain parallels with the Germany of 1919.  In 
both cases, the various governmental institutions failed to meet the fundamental needs of 
the public or to prevent a collapse of the national economy.  The responses to these 
problems by the two governments were, however, quite different.  The Weimar 
Government, beset by revolution from within and international economic sanctions from 
without, was forced to look primarily to its own survival and to attempting to restore 
order.  Solving the problems of human needs became, by default, the responsibility of the 
cities.  Only once a sense of order was restored did the national government become a 
critical participant in local matters.  Even then, the expansion of national policies and 
laws was oriented more to expanding local powers than to the direct participation of the 
national government. 
 The coming to power of the NSDAP in January 1933 resulted in a radically 
different approach.  The NSDAP, from its first day in power, began to respond to the 
basic economic problems facing the nation.  The two key approaches focused upon the 
need to redefine the role of governmental institutions and to provide a national planning 
system and programs to meet the needs of the state as defined by the NSDAP. 
 Foremost among the governmental revisions was the consolidation of decision 
making power at the highest possible level (the Leadership Principle).  Under this 
consolidation, the municipalities were forced to share many of the strong local powers 
that they had held from the time of the Stein reforms (1807) and the Prussian “City 
Freedom” Act of 1819.  They became direct outlets for national policy and, in effect, 
“trustees of the national community.”8  Local autonomy, innovation, initiative, and 
experimentation all became subsidiary to national direction, national goals, and national 
controls. 
 Concerning city planning, the municipality still held the power to plan for 
housing, recreation, transportation, and land use needs as long as the municipal 
approaches were not in contradiction with national, state, or regional needs.9  The 
rationale for the forced realigning (Gleichschaltuung) of government powers was not 
simply for efficiency or the meeting of national needs.  There was also a major economic 
motive; many cities across the nation were bordering on bankruptcy.  In fact, the 
municipal financial plight was the critical point in the new government’s justification for 
its control of local functions.10  The NSDAP leaders argued that the municipalities had 
not made adequate provisions for meeting local needs and that their priorities were not in 
order.  More succinctly, it was stated that local municipalities had been taking a “political 
and financial flight from reality”.  This castigation of the state of local affairs was 
coupled with the wholesale replacement of 99 percent of all municipal officials and fifty-
one of fifty-five large city mayors.11  The net result of the NSDAP control over local 
politics was sarcastically noted in a headline of the Muncih newspaper Neueste 
Nachrichten: “City Council Meetings Public Again – Throngs Rush to City Hall.”12 
 
Ideological Perspectives 
 
  The state of the German city during the Weimar years and the responses designed 
to overcome urban problems were the subjects of regular NSDAP sponsored diatribes.  
The behavior of the “democratic mob”, the ineffectiveness of the “city based” Weimar 
government, the art of the urban oriented avant-garde, the modernist architecture and 
urban design of the Bauhaus, and the international character of the German city were all 
condemned.13 
 The writings of the romantic ideologists of the nineteenth century provided the 
antecedents for much of the anti-urban stance of the National Socialists.  These writings 
appear to have had particular influence upon the thoughts of Gottfried Feder and Walther 
Darré, the two leading “settlement” ideologists of the Third Reich.  Both men advocated 
the dissolution of the industrial city and the promotion of the rural Volk as being key 
steps in the creation of a truly “National-Socialist” state.  Feder was quite influential in 
the development of the NSDAP platform on economic, spatial, and settlement questions 
prior to the Party’s assumption of power.  Later, shortly after the NSDAP came to power 
in 1933, he became director of the Reich Settlement Office.  Through this organization he 
proposed concepts that were to guide the de-urbanization of the nation.  More 
specifically, he advocated: (1) the halting of urban growth; (2) the dispersion of industry 
away from the cities; (3) the reduction in population of urban areas; and (4) the 
subjugation of all local, regional, and state planning to national needs.14 
 His ideas generated significant controversy.  Planners saw merit in lowering the 
density of urban centers and developing an alternative to the crowded rental blocks 
(Mietskasernen) that blanketed the large cities.  The militarists saw the ideas as helping to 
neutralize the impact of enemy bombing.  Others, such as Gauleiter Erich Koch of East 
Prussia saw the ideas as leading to economic growth in the Prussian East.15  Ideologists 
perceived them as contributing to the other hand, big business and agriculturalists, fearing 
a decrease in production, objected to the ideas.  Further, there was little support for the 
ideas from the citizenry. 
 Feder enjoyed a brief period of national governmental support for his ideas at the 
start of the Third Reich.  However, they proved so unworkable that they were quickly 
abandoned.  He was removed from his position in less than one year.  His ideas were 
considered to be so medieval, so economically disruptive, and so unpopular with 
industrialists and policy makers that Economic Minister Hjalmar Schacht removed him 
from office.  He was replaced by Wilhelm Ludovici, who continued to develop the new 
settlement ideas but without the strident call for the elimination of urban systems and 
infrastructure. 
 Feder’s position as the leading settlement ideologist was assumed by Walther 
Darré.  Darré was equally as anti-urban as Feder and argued for the strengthening of the 
rural peasant at the expense of the city.  However, unlike Feder, he continued to be a 
powerful party and governmental official throughout the 1930s. 
 Neither Feder nor Darré were able to develop effective steps designed to stop the 
growth and expansion of the cities.  However, it should be pointed out that anti-urbanism 
still remained as a critical ideological consideration in government policy.  In fact, 
intentional anti-urbanism was a significant ideological input in the goals of the Recovery 
Years.  This input could be particularly noted in settlement, agricultural expansion, and 
regionalization policies. 
 
Planning in the Recovery Years 
 
The Beginning 
 The first governmental effort to stimulate an economic revival focused upon the 
need to create jobs and to expand the supply of housing.  The primary legislative 
enactment was the Law for the Reduction of Unemployment (June 1933).  This act was 
comprehensive and included several elements that related to municipal planning, 
including the building of 7000 kilometers of national highways (Autobahnen) and the 
financing of small-scale municipally sponsored public improvement projects.  (These 
were cynically referred to as Pyramidenbau – the building of pyramids, or, less 
euphemistically, “make work” jobs).  Among these improvements were repairs to private 
houses; the building of new houses; agricultural resettlement; and highway, subway, 
river, rail, and road transportation improvements.16   
 Two other acts were also crucial in the formation of the national government’s 
policies toward German cities and towns.  The first was the Hereditary Farm Law of 
1033.  The act was intended to be the cornerstone of the creation of a permanent peasant 
class.  It was designed to stabilize the family farm, contribute to the creation of a strongly 
nationalistic peasantry, and promote national autarchy.  It also prohibited owners from 
disposing of their property and restricted the inheritance of the farm to the first born son.  
The second was the Act to Layout Areas for Residential Settlements (hereafter referred to 
as the settlement act).  This act was designed to control urban expansion, stop real estate 
speculation, and expand the housing supply.17 
 The lack of housing represented the most critical city planning problem of the 
early 1930s.  Throughout the Weimar period the German cities were unable to match 
housing demand, supply, and the ability of the dweller to obtain housing financing.  By 
1932, this problem became so severe that hundreds of thousands of units were vacant 
while thousands of people were living in shacks or with extended families.18  The average 
amount of housing built per year during the Weimar era was approximately 200,000 
units.  In the first four years of the Third Reich (1933-1936) housing supply increased to 
an average of 300,000 units per year.  Yet due to increased marriages, pent-up demand, 
and growing families, supply still did not keep up with demand.  By the start of the first 
Four Year Plan, for example, demand had reached 350,000 units per year. 
 The settlement act was a major program in the effort to overcome the housing 
problems.  Over 65,000 settler homes were built under this program in the first four years 
of the Third Reich.  These settlements were designed to have a strong folkish orientation 
and were to create an alternative to the dank, overcrowded tenement blocks.  This 
program included three primary settlement types: (1) the “house with farm” where the 
dweller could work in both field and factory (Nebensiedlung), (2) the privately owned 
home with a few acres to grow produce for personal consumption (Kleinsiedlung), and 
(3) the privately owned home and garden on the urban fringe (Heimstätte).  The 
settlement act represented a policy extension of the Unemployment Act in that it stressed 
self-help, self sufficiency, and job-creation.  There was a distinct fear that the economic 
depression would not be overcome and that industrial production would not return to the 
levels of either the pre-war or the mid-Weimar era.  Therefore, it was essential that the 
state and its citizens develop their own autarchic system.  This program was also intended 
to reduce pressures on the city so that slum removal could be undertaken. 
 Both the Hereditary Farm Law and the settlement act underscored the startling 
fact that a new approach to city planning was in operation.  In both cases there was little 
discussion of local needs and desires, little concern for local priorities, and little 
involvement with traditional city planners.  These two acts were designed by and for the 
national government.  National ideology, national settlement policies, national defense 
policy, and the national response to the Depression were the key elements that 
contributed to their implementation.  Further, they were part of a national population 
policy (Bevolkerungspolitik) that might be labeled “Imperialism by Demography”.  
Included within this policy were the following: urban decentralization, resettlement of 
German speaking people in newly occupied land, the solution to the living space 
(Lebensraum) problem, expansion of farm production to attain increased agricultural self 
sufficiency, and finally, the creation of a buffer zone for military defense purposes 
between the German nation and its neighbors.19 
 The design and the site planning of housing also reflected national ideological 
characteristics.  To the party ideologists, housing was critically important as a culture 
building agent.  (It should be noted that Weimar planners often held a similar view).  By 
meeting the housing demand and providing the proper design ethos, the ideologists 
perceived that a positive sense of Heimat could be created.20  This, in turn, would provide 
a powerful motivation toward and reinforcement of the cultural attributes being 
developed by the NSDAP.  Thus, the party propaganda office developed a large scale 
“selling effort”.  Phrases such as “settler joy” (Siedlerfreuden), “settler prosperity” 
(Siedlergluck), the “beauty of homesteading” (Schönheit des Siedelns), and folk 
community (Volksgemeinschaft) became common in the popular press of the day.  
Articles and photographs showing beautiful maidens working in the fields adjacent to the 
new settlements or walking along rustic streets with new housing in the background 
appeared with regularity.21 
 The most commonly perceived house design of the period was the “Hansel and 
Gretel Candy Covered Cottage” type.  Thousands of units were built in this image as well 
as the more simple Heimatstil, Fachwerk, and Tyrolean designs.22  Exposed timbers, 
exterior privies, stables, and peaked roofs were common design elements.  The intention 
in these designs was to create a feeling for the spirit of the past and to contribute to an 
enhancement of Erman culture while meeting current shelter needs.  Simplicity, tradition, 
permanence, unity with land, and Heimat are descriptive terms that could apply to the 
intent of these designs.23  At the same time that these designs were being advocated, there 
was also a move to discredit the modernist design concepts of the Weimar period.  The 
stark facades, the flat roofs and the small scale of the living units were all condemned.  
Yet the intentions and the results do not totally match.  Thousands of housing units were 
built that reflected the technological and design advances that were developed during the 
Weimar years.  In fact, once the rhetoric of both the avant-garde of the 1920s and the 
NSDAP arbiters of culture in the 1930s is removed, there are significant design 
similarities between the two periods. 
 The small settlement structures were to be sited differently, in theory, from the 
regular orthogonal layout that had become common during the Weimar years.  The 
orthogonal plan was to be conceptually replaced by the circle.  Only through such an 
organically derived shape, it was felt, could a sense of community be derived.  The intent 
was to “unite people in a readiness to help and participate in community life”, and to 
stimulate the feeling of the organic character of man in nature.24  This concept was a 
repudiation of the rationally derived row-on-row (Zeilenbau) designs of the Weimar era 
planners.25  Indeed, the National Socialist theorists perceived that the Zeilenbau treatment 
oriented man toward himself, while circular designs (Kreisbildendes Prinzip), helped to 
create a sense of community.  In essence the circle was used to reflect the medieval 
village (Burg) rather than the Castrum-like Civitas,26 and to help overcome mental 
urbanization (Seelische Verstädterung).  The concept was at least partially applied in 
many settlements across the nation.  However, as with the architectural designs, there 
were also many more settlements which were based upon site planning principles that 
had evolved during the Weimar years. 
 In sum, the ideological emphasis upon settlement design patterns generally 
stressed the following points: the need for unity through building (Einigung), 
romanticism, medieval settlement patterns, and the community as an arm of the state.  
These characteristics were not always present.  In fact, there was extensive diversity in 
design concepts, site planning, and architectural styles. 
 
The Performance 
 
 The Hereditary Farm Law accomplished little in terms of creating a permanent 
peasant class.  There were several reasons for this.  The inability of the owners to dispose 
of the land restricted the ability to mortgage it and, in turn, to buy equipment and 
supplies.  The lack of available land for those dispossessed by the law meant more people 
were forced to move to the city for work.  The farm land not covered by the act, and 
hence available for sale, was too expensive for the dispossessed.  Also, NSDAP members 
had first priority in buying this land.  Lastly, the large Junker estates were exempt from 
the act and were kept in their current ownership.  The net result was that the farmer did 
not become more rooted to the soil and the ruralite movement to the city continued with 
little impediment. 
 The settlement act was not as extensive a failure as the Hereditary Farm Law but 
it, too, did not meet expectations.  In particular, it accomplished little in stopping the 
migration of residents to the city.  Only in the university cities of Heidelberg, Münster, 
and Bonn was there a net decline in urban population.27  In effect, by 1934, there was an 
urban population boom that came close to matching the record of the 1890s.  The 
government, noting its inability to influence where growth would occur, began to 
reconsider its position as a subsidizer of small settlements.  In 1935, it decided to stop 
subsidizing these programs altogether.28 
 The settlement act did result in the building of thousands of dwelling units during 
the Recovery Years.  In this regard, it could be considered as being successful.  It also 
could be considered successful in that it established a three-tiered land planning system 
that integrated local, regional, and national planning goals.  However, upon further 
analysis, the system was not as simple as it first appeared.  At the national level, decision-
making was spread among the Ministries of Labor (settlement planning), Agriculture 
(rural settlement planning), and Economics (small settlements).  It was not until 1935 that 
land use planning began to function in a coordinated and effective manner.  At that time, 
land use was consolidated under the National Bureau of Spatial Planning.29  With control 
over national, regional, and local land use plans, its key responsibilities included 
population resettlement, industrial location, the planning of transportation networks, soil 
improvements, and defense preparedness. 
 The responsibilities of the bureau were carried out within a strong ideological 
framework.  In fact, the head of the organization, Minister Hans Kerrl, included the 
“increase of the biological folkish-strength” as being one of its aims.30  Inherent in the 
mandate of this organization were the concepts of Lebensraum and Geopolitik.31  Fritz 
Schumacher, former city planning director of Hamburg, saw these ideas as being the 
result of a new conceptualization of space that had been stimulated by both technological 
advances and by the national border constrictions imposed upon the nation by the Treaty 
of Versailles.32  Space had become a weapon in the struggle for national existence.  It was 
interpreted in terms of spirituality, nature, land, settlement, and community.  Space 
determination was to be the overriding means of creating a sense of national unity and 
community.33 
 The next level below the National Bureau of Spatial Organization consisted of 
twenty-three regional planning organizations that covered the entire nation.  Modeled 
after the much-heralded Ruhr Regional District, these organizations were responsible for 
developing the plans that evolved from national policies and directives.  Beneath these 
organizations were the local municipal planning agencies which implemented the plans 
and administered controls within their own boundaries.  Their responses, in turn, were 
closely monitored and tightly controlled by both the regional agencies and the Bureau. 
 
National Involvement in Municipal Planning 
 
 The city proper was not initially a direct focus of national government attention 
during the recovery years.  However, as the period moved toward its end, the national 
government began increasingly to focus upon urban revitalization activities.  In fact, there 
was an apparent correlation between the relative prosperity of the nation and the national 
government’s interest in urban centers; as the nation prospered and the need for consumer 
goods and industrial production rose, the city became increasingly more important to the 
national government. 
 The national leadership saw the city as having both economic and symbolic 
functions.  The economic functions included job creation and the financial spin-off that 
could be gained from the new structures.  In terms of serving a symbolic function, the 
city was to be the place where the true glory of the new state could be found.  The new 
structures – in combination with the flags, sculptures, music, and masses of people – 
were to contribute to the reinforcement of a new national spirit.34  This spirit, in turn, was 
to serve as the basis for the formation of a “community of the people”.  In one sense, 
from a national perspective, the city was viewed as an inanimate architectural space that 
was to be a crucible in which support for the state was nurtured.35  This perspective 
becomes clear when one examines the plans that were designed under National Socialist 
auspices.  The greatest emphasis was upon the construction of urban squares, plazas, 
monuments, and public buildings.  Largely emphasizing neoclassical designs, these 
structures were designed to reflect such feelings as awe, permanence, and strength.  
These designs emerged as a result of the party leadership’s belief that the lack of 
monumentality in civic structures was symptomatic of the cultural debasement of the 
nation: “stone monuments”, based upon the party’s ideological stances, were to 
contribute toward correcting the problem.36   
 Nowhere was monumentality as important as in Nürnberg and Berlin.  In 
Nürnberg, the “city of the party rallies”, extensive planning effort was placed on creating 
spaces that would allow for the magnanimity of the party events to emerge.37  It was to 
create a setting where the nation (and the world) could perceive the political, communal, 
and military strength of the nation.  Rhetorical descriptions of the period included such 
phrases as “proof of German strength and will”, “a shrine for the nation”, and “on these 
grounds, the communal experience of the unity of Führer and Volk was possible”.38 
 The plan for Berlin was intended to serve as the guide for the creation of the 
capital of the new Empire (Reichshauptstadt).39  The monumental scale that was being 
built into Nürnberg was surpassed in Berlin.  The Great Hall, the Arch of Triumph, the 
Soldiers Hall, and the North and South Railroad Stations, among others, were to be some 
of the most massive structures in the world to that time.  To illustrate the scale, St. Peter’s 
Cathedral would have fit several times over into the proposed Great Hall.  Further, the 
Arch of Triumph was to be forty-nine times larger than the Arc de Triomphe in Paris.  
The planning for Berlin was entrusted by Hitler to the architect Albert Speer.  He 
reported directly to Hitler and was given extensive funds and staff to accomplish his 
tasks.  The planning of Berlin, as with Nürnberg, was mainly carried out during the First 
Four Year Plan. 
 It is interesting to note how the national government was able to gain the power to 
supersede the local plans of both Nürnberg and Berlin.  In the Nürnberg case, in 1935, 
Hitler expressed grave concern for the people of Nürnberg – particularly because his plan 
required the relocation of the city zoo.  He therefore asked Mayor Willi Liebel for his 
support and volunteered to pay all relocation costs.  Speer analyzed Hitler’s approach as 
follows: 
 
 Two years later Hitler would come directly to the point in dealing with a mayor: 
Here is the Party Rally Area; this is how we’re going to do it.  But at that time, in 1935, he did not 
yet feel so completely in command and so spent almost an hour on prefatory explanations before 
he placed any sketch on the table.40 
  
 By 1936, Hitler had begun to take action independently of the local city’s position.  Such 
was the case with the planning of Berlin.  Throughout most of the Recovery Years, the planning 
for Berlin was controlled by the city administration.  During that period, Hitler presented several 
ideas to Mayor Julius Lippert concerning the remaking of the city into the Reichshauptstadt.  
Lippert was not overly enthusiastic about Hitler’s plans.  Hitler first threatened to relocate the 
capital and then simply decided to by-pass all government agencies and turn the planning over to 
Albert Speer, his new General Building Inspector.  His actions in this case illustrate the power of 
the leadership principle.  When the city was not supportive of national needs or policies, its 
freedom to act or react on planning matters was simply removed.  In this case, the national 
government stripped the Mayor of Berlin, the Berlin City Council, the Governor of Greater 
Berlin, and the national Ministry of the Interior of all planning powers concerning the capital, and 
turned the power over to the General Building Inspection Office. 
 Nürnberg and Berlin were not the only cities scheduled to receive extensive planning 
assistance from the national government.  Among others, Munich (the capital of the movement), 
Hamburg (the city of foreign trade), and Linz were also programmed to be the recipients of 
extensive national planning assistance.  Labeled as “reconstruction cities”, each was to house 
national government and party offices and institutions.41  Further, each was to have its core area 
substantially changed to reflect the ideologies of the new order.42 
 Few of the proposed structures were actually built during the recovery years.  Yet those 
that were built constituted dramatic announcements that the new design approaches and 
ideological concepts were being applied.  This could be particularly noted in the designs for 
Nürnberg’s Zeppelinfeld and Congress Hall, Munich’s House of German Art, and Berlin’s 
Olympic Stadium.43  These design and planning concepts captured the imagination of governor 
(Gaulieter) after governor who, in time, attempted to apply them in their own cities.  In time, the 
plans proposed for Berlin came to be rigid models for cities across the nation.44  In sum, the cities 
became more and more important to the nation-state as the Recovery Years came to a close. 
   
Other Activities 
 
 The emphasis upon solving the problems of housing overshadowed all other 
traditional planning activities during the Recovery Years.  Relatively few cultural or 
recreational facilities were built.  Industrial and commercial activities were rarely 
expanded due to existing excess capacity.  While long range planning activities addressed 
these functions, they were low priorities until the First Four Year Plan.  Concerning 
highways, as mentioned earlier, extensive work was undertaken during the Recovery 
Years.  The national highway system (Autobahnen), proposed since the early 1920s, was 
planned and implemented.  This system represented the most significant technological 
advance of the period, and it fulfilled several needs.  First, it provided a psychological 
and functional connection among the nation’s large cities.  Secondly, it expanded the 
commuting catchment area.  In essence, the city and its Hinterland became more closely 
bound.  This then enabled a feasible expansion of the previously mentioned Heimstätte 
concept.  Thirdly, it provided thousands of jobs for formerly unemployed laborers.  
Lastly, and perhaps of the greatest national significance, it served a military objective by 
providing a means of rapid deployment to the potential fronts surrounding the nation. 
  
The Recovery Years in Perspective  
  
 City planning during the recovery years was marked by several unique 
characteristics.  The leadership principle, “imperialism by demography”, and the anti-
urban ideologies stimulated a refocusing of objectives, priorities, and methods.  At the 
same time, these changes co-existed with a strong sense of pragmatism which 
emphasized an economic revival and an expansion of the housing supply.  It is clear that 
the end results of these nationally imposed policies were not totally dissimilar to those of 
the previous period.  In fact, in terms of the implementation of city plans, whenever 
ideology and economic pragmatism were in conflict, the latter appears to have taken 
precedence as a controlling influence. 
 
 
 
 
Planning in the First Four Year Plan (1935-1940) 
Where Fits the City? 
 
 If the recovery years can be considered the “time of ideological ruralization” then 
the First Four Year Plan must be considered the “time of the city”.45 
 The most significant stimulus toward a shift to urban concerns came from the 
military.  In fact, a concern for military power was inherent in most major policy 
decisions affecting Germany.  As early as 1935 one could begin to note the change.  In 
that year, an act was passed giving the military the right to expropriate any land that it 
needed.46  At the same time, an increasingly large share of the Gross National Product 
(GNP) was shifted to military needs.  (The economist Guillebaud labeled the shift as 
being “guns instead of houses”).47 
 The results of this shift were felt in virtually all sectors of German life, including 
city planning.  It could be noted in several ways.  First, the military required large masses 
of land for training bases.  This land was primarily agricultural.  The net result was that 
gross farm acreage began to decline.  Second, the military needed large supplies of 
technical material and manufactured goods.  The places where they could be produced 
were in the industrial districts of the cities.  This caused a large influx of people to these 
areas seeking defense-related employment.  The net result of this shift in priorities was 
that rural residents were moving to the city at a rate of 2.5 percent per year.  (This 
compares with 1.5 percent during the Weimar years).  While the existence of these jobs 
was a strong pull, it should also be pointed out that the typical urban worker earned 50 
percent more in wages than his rural counterpart.48  Lastly, the shift to a military focus 
caused the national government to make housing a lower priority.  This shift, in turn, 
resulted in an extensive ripple effect that spread throughout the nation.  On a primary 
level, it meant continued dependence on the over-crowded center cities which meant that 
slum removal had to be delayed.49  Several developments point out the severity of the 
impact of the decision to shift away from housing: (1) housing became a black market 
item, (2) one million slum units continued to exist in the central core, (3) 35 percent of all 
families lacked suitable housing, and (4) housing construction fell increasingly short of 
the needed supply.50 
 The change in priorities also resulted in a shift away from ruralization.  How 
could the government support a ruralization policy when industrial, technical, 
transportation, and military needs had precedence?  The net result was that the NSDAP 
rural policies of the recovery years were virtually ignored.  More farms were established 
during the Weimar years of 1925-32 than under National Socialist rule between 1932 and 
1939.  Further, the farm population had become so depleted by 1939 that an agricultural 
mobilization program had to be developed.51 
 
The Urban Core 
 
 Three phenomena emerge from the national government’s influence on core area 
city planning during the First Four Year Plan.  First, in the center cities, housing and 
recreation/culture – two of the key basic city planning functions noted in the Athens 
Charter of 1933 – were of little direct interest to the national leaders.  (Interestingly, as 
previously noted, there was national interest for housing outside the core city).  Secondly, 
for a nation that stressed its rootedness in the soil, it seemed quite strange that nationally 
supported projects in the city placed virtually no emphasis upon greenery.  In fact, nature 
(trees, shrubs, grass) was removed from Munich’s Königsplatx, Berlin’s Lustgarten 
facing Schinkel’s Museum, and the square in front of the Berlin Technical University in 
order to enhance a feeling of “community”.52  Similar squares were to be placed in cities 
across the nation.  Thirdly, the concept of symbolism in design continued to thrive 
despite a general decline in the importance of ideology.  Regardless of its size, each 
community was to have a central structural focal point (Stadtkrone) that was designed to 
enhance the state.  While many plans were created, very few were implemented.  They 
were costly and required scarce building resources and manpower skills.  The planning of 
core area projects virtually ceased in late 1939.  At that time the shift to a wartime 
economy forced the implementation program to be delayed. 
 
New Towns: Practice and Theory 
 
 There was also a national effort to create new towns during the First Four Year 
Plan.  These towns were primarily intended to aid in enlarging the resource extraction 
base of the nation, to expand its industrial capability, and to stimulate economic growth 
in “backwater” areas.  Only two were actually started.  These were the “Town of the 
Hermann Goering–Werke” at Salzgitter and the “Strength Through Joy Automobile 
Town” at Wolfsburg. 
 The Goering-Werke was to be an ideal, highly structured National Socialist 
community.  Proposed ultimately to house 300,000 people, it was originally designed 
with an elaborate Stadtkrone at its center.  Housing was located in satellite areas and was 
to be connected to work places by high-speed autobahns.  It was never fully implemented 
but was, in part, adapted to postwar conditions.  Now called Salzgitter, it houses over 
30,000 people.53 
 The other totally new effort was the “Strength Through Joy Automobile Town”.  
Hitler, very early in his regime, became enamored with the idea of a “people’s” car.  He 
commissioned the automotive engineer Ferdinand Porsche to develop this vehicle and in 
1934 the basic design was ready.  Hitler then decreed that a new plant and city be built in 
the underpopulated, underdeveloped, northern hinterland.  Declaring that the city would 
be “one of the happiest and most beautiful in the world”, he laid the cornerstone in 1939 
of what was to be another model for a fascist new town.  Under the planning direction of 
Peter Kolb and advisorship of Albert Speer, the design was dramatically imperialist in 
scope.  It was to have been dominated by an acropolis consisting of party buildings, 
theater, great hall, and cultural center.  This complex was never built.  The town did 
begin to take shape during the Third Reich, but the makeshift housing and barracks-like 
atmosphere did not meet the expectations of the master plan.  The original plan was 
modified in the postwar period, and only then did the Volkswagen city of Wolfsburg, as 
it is now called, take form.54 
 
The End 
 
 The remilitarization of the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, and the seizure 
of Czechoslovakia called for the supremacy of military needs above all else.  Thus, the 
capital improvement projects were placed in abeyance.  Housing, more than any other 
city planning program, was the greatest victim of military domination.  In fact, housing 
starts had declined to 138,000 units by 1940.  In order to quiet growing concern over the 
lack of housing, the government announced a comprehensive housing program that 
would start upon the end of the war.  The houses were to be “airy, sun-filled and set in 
gardens”.  This program was greeted with great cynicism by the populace.  A sarcastic 
observation concerning this announcement, made by Germans who had been victimized 
by bombing, concluded, “Well, now we really have houses with plenty of light, air and 
sunshine”.55 
 
Summary 
 
 The National Socialist government was an active participant in local city 
planning.  The bureaucratic relationships were restructured so that the cities came 
increasingly under national government domination.  National planning efforts initially 
focused upon resettlement concepts within a strong anti-urban context, and were intended 
to halt urban growth and decentralize the population.  These efforts stressed the 
development of small family farm settlements and emphasized self-sufficiency.  Initially, 
the designs reflected folkish beliefs but they rapidly moved to a wider selection of 
approaches. 
 The most extensive community assistance efforts were made during the recovery 
years.  The heavy welfare burden, unemployment, and lack of housing inherited by the 
National Socialist government prompted swift action.  The First Four Year Plan reflected 
the rising spectre of militarism.  Public services and funds were regularly placed second 
to defense considerations.  In spite of this, city planning efforts were still undertaken to 
create cultural, governmental, and political structures and spaces.  These reflected the 
ideological values of glorification of the state, cultural permanence, and strength.  Efforts 
were also undertaken to create new communities.  In summary, however, city planning 
became less and less important to the national government as the decade came to a close. 
 Comparisons of the Weimar Republic era with the National Socialist times often 
characterize the former as being urban oriented while the latter is characterized as rural 
oriented.  Although, as noted above, there was an overt anti-urban stance taken by the 
National Socialist theorists, the stances of planning theorists during Weimar times are 
less clear.  Sibyl Moholy-Nagy has labeled the theorists as focusing upon a Weichbild or 
“grey area” that was neither urban nor rural.56  The historian Manfredo Tafuri, on the 
other hand, considers the Weimar theorists as being anti-urban.57 
 It is clear that none of the Weimar city planners focused upon the city as an ideal 
form.  Rather, they emphasized escapist, small scale, limited size, balanced communities 
that were placed in a green belt.  These theorists felt that the city was too complex, too 
disorderly, too traditional, and too unchangeable.  For these reasons they advocated a new 
form of community.  This new form, in theory, would simplify the complexity of the 
community experience, bring order to the community form, and reflect a new 
Gesamtkultur or Wohnkultur. 
 The conceptualization of new community forms by the Weimar theorists did not 
reflect an overt dislike or hatred of cities.  Neither did it ascribe medieval characteristics 
to the people who were to reside in the new communities.  However, the theorists did see 
the need to decentralize, to recognize, and to create new non-urban communities.  To this 
end, the greatest emphasis of the Weimar era theorists lay in alternatives to the 
overcrowded, Mietskasernen dominated, center city.  Eventually, similar views were 
advocated by the NSDAP theorists as well. 
 The National Socialist theorists took on extremely anti-urban stances during the 
recovery years.  They argued for the rejection of urban life and the creation of the ordered 
city of the middle ages.  Yet once the rhetoric is removed, the approaches advocated by 
NSDAP theorists do not differ strongly from those of the Weimar era.  Both called for 
small settlements, for alternatives to urban living, for settlements that offered “field and 
factory”, and for the use of designs and site plans as symbols for the new era.  The key 
difference lay in the fact that the National Socialists advocated these changes as part of a 
nationally controlled program designed to further the objectives of the nation-state.  
Local autonomy, innovation, experimentation, and cultural views were not tolerated as 
much as they were during the Weimar period. 
 The central cities were of secondary importance both to the Weimar governments 
and to the National Socialist government through the recovery years.  In both cases, the 
emphasis was upon developing the urban fringe.  Only after the housing shortages were 
overcome was attention to be focused upon the center cities.  Since neither the Weimar 
nor NSDAP governments met this goal, the urban centers remained ignored except for 
some transportation changes, some efforts to protect the medieval character of existing 
cities, and some selected model urban renewal projects.58  The military and employment 
requirements that surfaced in the First Four Year Plan brought a refocusing of objectives 
on the part of the NSDAP to an urban orientation.  Once this happened, extensive plans 
were developed for selected cities.  However, few of these were ever implemented. 
 National efforts under the NSDAP to stimulate, guide, and control urban planning 
have had a long term impact upon city planning in West Germany.  On the positive side, 
the decentralization of cities, the idea of building controlled settlements within 
agricultural areas, and the creation of the Autobahnen are all considered to have been 
quite beneficial.  The negative aspects are more indirect.  In fact, they relate more to the 
question of planning itself as opposed to what planning does.  For example, Hans Arndt 
has written that the bitter memory of the national planning effort undertaken by the 
National Socialists is so vivid as to make the very idea of national planning an 
anathema.59  The architectural historian Wolfgang Pehnt has reinforced this view: “Any 
planning measure is regarded with distrust ….”  Instead of democratizing the planning 
procedures and replacing poor with better planning, it is planning as such that is 
condemned.60  This negative feeling presently exists.  A concern over national usurpation 
of local powers and initiative is still strong at all levels of government.  One net result of 
this is that the experience of nationally guided planning will not likely be repeated again 
in Germany. 
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